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Abstract 
Who orders and facilitates the interactions between private individuals and criminals engaged 
in transnational kidnap for ransom? Past work shows that organised crime groups govern grey 
and criminal markets, while private firms often fill the formal governance vacuum in legal 
international transactions. The intersection between the formal and criminal economies 
presents a range of intractable coordination and enforcement problems. I argue that a unique 
group of insurers at Lloyd’s have created contracts, protocols, norms, and agencies especially 
suited to this unusual market. They minimise the kidnapping of insured workers, high net-
worth individuals, and tourists. They also ensure that hostages are treated well, coordinate 
to keep ransoms moderate and stable, and discourage kidnappers from reneging on agreed 
ransoms. Prevention and orderly resolutions create a profitable market for kidnap insurance. 
Understanding this governance architecture is crucial for remedying current trends in 
“terrorist” kidnap for ransom.  
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Introduction 
Thousands of people are kidnapped worldwide every year. Employees of multinational 
organisations, contractors, business travellers, and high-net-worth individuals are particularly 
attractive targets. Kidnaps are frightening – and potentially complicated and expensive to 
resolve. Total annual ransom payments are estimated at up to US$1.5bn (The Independent, 
2010; Catlins, 2012, Agenda Week, 2012). In recent years buying kidnap and ransom insurance 
has become an accepted cost of doing business in conflict-ridden, stateless, and weakly 
governed territories (The Economist 2006, 2013, Kenney 2007/08, Fink and Pingle 2014). Yet, 
kidnap for ransom - and its insurance - would not be possible without effective norms and 
protocols to order the trade in hostages and without institutions to enforce and maintain 
them. This paper argues that insurers provide governance at the ragged intersection between 
the legal and criminal economies, thereby introducing a new agent to the study of extra-legal 
governance. I provide a detailed analysis of the complex governance architecture developed 
by insurers to stabilise kidnapping, guide their customers’ interaction with the criminal 
underworld, and facilitate orderly transactions.  
Transnational kidnaps have several features which (in combination) make self-
governance particularly intractable and interesting to study (Greif 2005, Munger 2010). Often 
kidnap victims are picked opportunistically, creating a random pairing of agents for a one-off 
transaction.1 Bargaining takes place under incomplete information regarding the victim’s 
financial situation and the kidnapper’s criminal capital. Both sides have strong incentives to 
                                                          
1 Although some gangs target VIPs, most kidnappers do not know the identity of their victims ex ante 
when “logo hunting”, targeting expensive cars, ships, hotels, oil platforms or business premises. See 
Hagedorn Auerbach (1998 p30-36). 
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misrepresent their situation.2 Kidnappers can employ violence to extract information and 
concessions.3 Killing some hostages may raise the price offered for others.4 This anarchic 
bargaining is followed by a clandestine, sequential exchange. Even if both parties act in good 
faith, the hand-over may be intercepted by law enforcement or other criminals.5 There is no 
redress if either party cheats or reneges on the deal. Victims generally do not broadcast their 
experiences, but information-sharing is essential for multi-lateral enforcement mechanisms 
(Greif 2005).6 This set-up would lead us to expect lengthy, messy, and potentially brutal 
negotiations with uncertain outcomes. Media coverage of kidnap cases with gruesome 
conclusions confirm this impression. Yet, most criminal kidnap cases are resolved remarkably 
smoothly and extremely discreetly – especially when the victims are insured. Very few insured 
hostages are killed, violence (while often threatened) is limited, and hostages are usually 
released after ransoms are paid (Lobo-Guerrero 2007, Lopez 2011, Merkling and Davis 2001). 
Moreover, ransoms in insured kidnap cases are generally predictable, low, and stable (Catlins 
2012, Bankrate 2012, Shortland 2016). The degree of order observed in insured kidnaps 
suggests the presence of effective institutions of governance to regulate exchange.  
                                                          
2 For “local-on-local” kidnaps there is better information on individuals’ wealth.  
3 The “quality of the goods” (i.e. the state of the hostage) is only revealed after the exchange.  
4 See Leeson 2010 on “torture for reputation”. 
5 This creates an incomplete monitoring situation, where parties may mistakenly believe that 
cheating occurred. 
6 Families and firms do not want to publicly advertise that they paid a ransom. For “local-on-local” 
kidnaps discreet communication between victims creates a shadow of the future.  
4 
 
This contrasts starkly with terrorist kidnaps, where insurance is proscribed.7 Torture 
and murder are common and million dollar ransoms generate further kidnaps (NYT 2014, 
Sandler et al 2016). Terrorist kidnaps are highly politicised: the human security of the hostage 
must be weighed against governments’ broader security aims (UN 2013, White House Briefing 
2015). Most governments officially adopt a “no negotiation” policy, but several are known to 
negotiate on behalf of their citizens (NYT 2014, Sandler et al 2016). Democratic governments 
have a poor track record in limiting ransom payments – especially if they are officially 
committed to not negotiating at all  (Lee 2013, Browne and Dickson 2010). This puts the lives 
of citizens of non-negotiating nations in peril: if a group holds multiple hostages, murder and 
“torture-for-reputation” can raise overall pay-offs (Leeson 2010). Where it is politically 
infeasible to deprive citizens of their right to life, governments may permit private resolutions 
(Block and Tinsley 2008, White House Briefing 2015). This paper examines the private 
governance structures which preserve lives and limit ransoms in criminal kidnaps. An 
appreciation the complexity of this governance architecture is central for future political 
initiatives to order terrorist kidnap for ransom. 
The extra-legal governance literature analyses institutions ordering a wide range of 
criminal and informal markets. Transnational kidnaps add an interesting dimension to this 
literature as they straddle legal and illegal markets and require extraterritorial governance.8 
Criminal markets – e.g. drugs, prostitution, informal credit, and contraband – are highly 
                                                          
7 Section 17A of UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 states that it is a criminal offence to 
reimburse a ransom with actual knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that it was paid to 
terrorist groups.  
8 See also Leeson and Nowrasteh’s 2011 “plunder contracts” between 18th century pirates and their 
victims.  
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vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour and predation. This creates demand for protection and 
enforcement. Criminal market governance is usually analysed through the lens of “protection 
theory” (Varese 2014). Mafias and other providers of informal governance such as clans and 
prison gangs can provide genuine services, e.g. dispute resolution, enforcement of informal 
contracts, retrieval of informal credits, and protection from harassment (Gambetta 1993, 
Leeson and  Rogers 2009, Skarbek 2011, 2014, Varese 2001, 2010, 2014). The distinguishing 
feature of mafias is their power to settle issues by (lethal) violence: punishments raise the 
cost of non-co-operation and cheating (Leeson and Rogers 2009).  
Mafias often provide quasi-state services (Bates et al 2002, Shortland and Varese 
2015). These may exist in parallel to state structures where trade partners prefer (fast and 
effective) mafia protection, dispute resolution and contract enforcement to state services 
(Skaperdas 2001, Gambetta, 1993). Mafias can therefore bridge the legal / illegal divide. 
However, the mafias’ ability to govern is limited to the territory where they can reliably 
deliver violence. Varese (2011) discusses the considerable obstacles to mafia transplantation 
and Campana (2013) shows that although mafias may conduct criminal activities outside their 
territory, they do not provide extraterritorial protection. Providers of extra-legal governance 
often facilitate the resolution of local kidnaps (e.g. Safer Yemen 2014), but they are not well 
placed to order (extraterritorial) transnational kidnaps. I argue that this governance space is 
largely filled by private insurers, which have not been considered as providers of governance 
in criminal markets so far.  
The literature on private governance in international transactions deals with a similar 
problem of extra-territoriality: states can only provide international governance 
cooperatively and are often unable (or slow) to develop the necessary institutions to do so. 
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Private firms have therefore created a plethora of norms, institutions and regimes to fill this 
governance vacuum (Cutler et al 1999, Stringham 2015, Jakobi 2015). Insurers have already 
received attention as providers of private governance in international affairs (Cutler et al 
1999, Haufler 1997, 1999). The focus has been on the interaction between insurers and 
governments (particularly as regards what is “insurable”) and insurers and their customers. 
Insured risks are to a significant extent controlled by policy-holders whose motivation to limit 
losses is reduced by obtaining insurance. Consequently, insurers must constrain opportunistic 
behaviour by their customers (Heimer 1985, Lobo-Guerrero 2007). However, no explicit 
attention has yet been paid to the role of insurers in ordering transnational criminal 
transactions. 
Crime and insurance are interlinked. Crime creates a demand for insurance and 
insurance can create additional criminal opportunities through moral hazard. Demand for 
insurance depends on risk perception. As one business insider explains: “Inquiries [for kidnap 
insurance] surge so predictably after well publicised crimes that I can almost plot it on a 
chart...” (The Economist 2006). This leads some commentators to suspect a “conspiracy” or 
“racket” between insurers and criminals (Clendenin 2006/2007, The Times 2012). Yet, when 
crime rates or the cost of resolution rise and insurance premia go up, or the crime is 
unpleasant, firms (and individuals) avoid the risks instead (Camacho and Rodriguez 2013, 
Pshisva and Suarez 2010). Profit-maximising insurers therefore should not treat crime as 
exogenous. In kidnap for ransom, insurers need to prevent casualties, effect quick resolutions, 
and keep ransoms within a reasonable range. If governance is successful, the demand for 
kidnap insurance is high and premium income reliably covers any arising claims, leaving a 
profit for insurers.  
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The paper examines the different norms and agencies of governance created by the 
insurance industry to govern kidnap for ransom. The governance regime constantly evolves: 
rules and procedures respond to market incentives, regulation, and legislation. Protocols 
differ across regions, over the insured activities, and among insurers. Many governance 
functions are carried out by close-knit communities of experts, where information and best 
practice are shared informally. There is a competitive market for expert services where 
excellence and successful innovations are rewarded. Failures in prevention and bungled 
resolutions lead to (heavy) financial losses, often followed by market exit. Certain standards 
and protocols required to stabilise the overall market are maintained through Lloyd’s of 
London, where the vast majority of kidnap for ransom insurance is underwritten Shortland 
2016).  
On the whole, privately created (informal) governance of kidnap for ransom functions 
well in difficult circumstances. Governance failure provides the impetus to innovate and 
adapt. Insurers do not have an incentive to reduce crime to zero, but they keep the volume 
of criminal transactions at a low level - limiting the impact of crime on the legal economy. This 
has important policy implications for dealing with terrorist kidnaps.   
 
2. Data Collection 
Kidnap for ransom, and its insurance and resolution, are a highly discreet business: 
knowledge that people are insured makes them targets and raises kidnappers’ ransom 
expectations (March 1988, Lobo-Guerrero 2007, Ochoa 2012). Criminals would value 
information about ransom negotiations and the profitability of kidnaps. Information is also 
not made public because of the distress it might cause kidnap victims.  For all these reasons, 
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it is difficult to “get inside” the kidnapping business. Other than Lobo-Guerrero 2007, there is 
little detailed academic research on how kidnap for ransom insurance works in practice. To 
overcome this problem, this research is based on 25 in-depth interviews and reflective 
conversations with “crisis response” consultants from several firms, risk analysts, insurers, 
lawyers and victims, often followed up with e-mail correspondence.9 Some consultants 
brought in tapes of ransom negotiations and Per Gullestrup of Clipper Shipping (Interview X) 
made the complete FBI transcript of a pirate ransom negotiation available. Control Risks – a 
major business risk consultancy - provided anonymised data from its global Kidnap for 
Ransom database. This combines private and open source information on kidnapping and is 
the data source for their global risk map product.10    
Most interviewees wished to remain anonymous and none of the conversations were 
recorded. Handwritten notes taken during interviews were summarised and direct quotes 
agreed afterwards, but no-one gave permission to publish the summaries, while others did 
not wish the material or the interview to be referred to at all. The references provide some 
information on the 16 people who agreed that the interview could be referred to.11 I therefore 
referenced open source material instead, including memoirs written by former negotiators 
(Clutterbuck 1978, 1987, Lopez 2011, March 1988, Wright 2009).  
 
                                                          
9 Seven of the interviewees were direct contacts. The other interviewees were obtained by 
snowballing  through their professional networks. 
10 https://www.controlrisks.com/riskmap  
11 With the exception of Interview XV the sources were male. All were professionals, Anglophone, 
white and ages ranged from mid-thirties to mid-seventies.   
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3: Governed vs Ungoverned Kidnap Markets  
Kidnap for ransom insurance was first developed by Lloyd’s of London following the infamous 
abduction of Charles Lindbergh’s young son in 1932, as a boutique product for wealthy 
individuals and top executives (Clutterbuck 1987, Economist 2006, Fink and Pingle 2014). 
Initially, ransoms were negotiated and delivered by the family or corporate stakeholders and 
subsequently reimbursed by the insurers (Clutterbuck 1978). The 1970s saw an escalation of 
high profile kidnappings in the US, Italy, and Latin America (Clutterbuck 1978, Lewis 2002). 
Fourteen of the 18 highest known ransoms were paid between 1972 and 1975 rising from 
US$1million to US$60million (Business Insider 2012). Many cases involved torture and 
deliberate mutilation and some victims died (Clutterbuck 1978, Lewis 2002). If this trajectory 
had continued unchecked, kidnap would have become uninsurable.   
In response, insurers developed governance mechanisms for the prevention and 
resolution of kidnaps. These have become highly effective over time. Data provided by crisis 
response companies specialised in resolving kidnaps indicate that in the last twenty years less 
than 2% of insured ransom negotiations ended with a dead hostage.12 The market leader, 
Control Risks, only “lost” eight hostages between 2000 and 2014 -  a rate of less than 0.5%.13 
Deaths are generally attributable to pre-existing medical conditions, rescue and escape 
attempts (Interview III, IV, V). Murder is highly unusual: “People are not killed as part of the 
                                                          
12 Interviews III, IV, V, Lobo-Guerrero 2007 
13 Personal communication Control Risks January 2016 
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process” (Interview IV). Consequently, potential victims are strongly advised to cooperate 
with their captors and wait patiently to be ransomed (ODI 2010).14  
Uninsured victims can take none of this for granted. For example, the 4 Thai sailors 
released by Somali pirates in February 2015 after more than five years in captivity had gone 
“through a long-time horrific ordeal in which their captors often used torture…” during which 
most of the crew died (Bloomberg 2015). Murphy (2012) wrote about the hostages of the 
Iceberg and Orna, also taken by Somali pirates: “…the general rule is: No insurance – no 
freedom”. The average percentage of people killed in kidnaps is estimated at around 9% - 
making fatalities in uninsured cases considerably higher than for insured cases (Lobo-
Guerrero 2007). 
Many governments have outlawed ransom payments and the reimbursement of 
ransoms paid to “terrorist” organisations: insurers can only order “criminal” cases.15 Where 
“terrorist” and “criminal” kidnap businesses co-exist, the outcomes are quite distinct.16 
Firstly, governments pay more: Foreign Policy 2015 reports that “…ransoms paid for hostages 
taken by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb averaged more than $5 million in 2012, while 
criminal kidnappings covered by insurance in the same geographical region were often 
resolved for about $80,000.” Secondly, “terrorists” are generally more violent. Hagedorn 
                                                          
14 Consultancies have an incentive to overstate their quality, but the community is sufficiently small 
for  misrepresentations to be found out. I cross-checked the information and found experts were 
well informed about competitor performance. The ODI 2010 “good practice” advice indicates that 
NGOs trust in the smooth functioning of the ransoming process.  
15 People can buy kidnap insurance even if the ransom payment cannot be insured. Incentives to do 
so  are reduced where the majority of kidnappers are suspected terrorists.  
16 Different markets coexist if governments disagree on whether an organisation should be 
proscribed. Otherwise we can compare outcomes before and after the “terrorist” label is applied. 
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Auerbach (1998 p119) reports Indian High Commission data on kidnappings in Kashmir from 
1990-1995. Around 2000 hostages were taken, of which 50% were known to have been killed, 
25% returned (often barely) alive and 25% were still missing. The Al Qaeda and IS strategy of 
torturing and beheading hostages (especially those for whom no ransom is offered) is 
reminiscent of the “torture-for-reputation” strategy employed by late 17th and early 18th 
century pirates. Leeson (2010) showed that a reputation for “madness” (i.e. destroying 
valuable goods) and “fiendish” torture - although costly in the short-term - enhanced long-
term pay-offs. Yet, criminal kidnapping gangs rarely adopt shock tactics and those which do 
tend not to survive long (New York Times 1998, Ochoa 2012).  
The distinction between “criminal” and “terrorist” modes of kidnap is well-known in 
the corporate world. Sometimes it is a political choice whether kidnappers are labelled as 
“terrorists”. As evidence mounted that radical Islamist group Al-Shabab benefited from 
Somali pirate ransoms (The Guardian 2009, Reuters July 2011, Shortland and Varese 2015), 
ship-owners strongly lobbied for the “criminal” label and hence the continued insurability of 
Somali piracy (The Guardian 2009). Indeed, the UK Piracy Ransoms Taskforce in 2012 decided 
not to criminalise pirate ransoms as initially intended (Interview IX, FCO 2012).  
In summary, a sea-change occurred in kidnap for ransom in the mid-1970s, but this 
change was specific to insured cases. There is a clear distinction between transactions 
governed by insurers and those resolved privately or by governments: both hostage mortality 
and ransoms are significantly lower among the insured. The following sections analyse how 
insurers govern criminal kidnap for ransom.  
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4. Governing Kidnap for Ransom  
The demand for insurance is positively related to risk perception and loss severity, but 
negatively to the insurance premium. There is a range of kidnap intensities and ransoms at 
which insurance is viable. Beyond an optimum risk level, however, passing on the higher cost 
of resolutions by raising insurance premia reduces the demand for insurance sufficiently to 
impinge on insurers’ profits.17 Insurers therefore have an economic incentive to limit 
kidnapping and control the cost of resolution. In addition, supplying attractive insurance 
products – such as annual policies – requires stability. To price long-term insurance correctly 
kidnap volumes and the cost of resolution must be predictable. If ransoms escalate, there are 
supernormal returns to kidnapping and new gangs enter the market (Hagedorn Auerbach 
1998, Shortland 2015, UN 2013, Wright 2009). The emergence of “kidnapping booms” and 
“hot-spots” indicates that kidnaps and ransoms can exhibit unstable dynamics.18 This may 
cause unexpected heavy losses for insurers. Adjusting criminals’ ransom expectations 
downward requires patient bargaining (Ambrus et al 2015). Maintaining ransom discipline is 
therefore crucially important: kidnapping must be “governed”.     
There is considerable debate in the political science literature on what constitutes  
“good governance” (Agnafors 2013). Scholars generally identify different “dimensions”, 
“domains” or “components” of governance. “Good” or “effective” governance requires that 
each component is satisfied at least at some threshold level (Agnafors 2013, Salter 1999, 
2001). Aligica and Tarko (2013) point out that institutions can be co-produced by different 
actors working for individual profit. This section outlines how governance of kidnap for 
                                                          
17 Modelling this complex relationship is beyond the scope of this paper. 
18 See for example the kidnap risk mapping at https://riskmap.controlrisks.com/ 
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ransom is co-produced in the various domains by private legal firms, criminals and 
governments.  
  
4.1. Domains of governance in kidnap for ransom 
Given the complexity of the problem, I split it into three different issue areas or 
“domains” of governance, following Salter (1999, 2001). Firstly, insurers must address 
adverse selection (i.e. refuse insurance to reckless customers) and discourage moral hazard: 
their customers must remain vigilant. Domain (A) in Table 1 below therefore focuses on 
insurance contracts. Secondly, insurers need to make kidnapping difficult, so domain (B) is 
the “Prevention” of kidnaps. Thirdly, insurers must incentivise kidnappers to refrain from 
violence and encourage their customers to maintain ransom discipline. Domain (C) is hence 
labelled “Resolution”.   
 
4.2. Regulation functions  
It is also useful to split governance into three regulation functions: standard-setting, 
monitoring & evaluation and intervention (Salter 1999, 2001). Each cell within the matrix of 
table 1 thus constitutes an essential governance function. Standard setting underpins the 
smooth functioning of the market. The standards must be adaptable: criminals respond to 
local political and economic change, law enforcement initiatives, corrupt state structures, and 
learn from past interactions. Insurers also respond to business demands for specific products 
and value-for-money, as well as government legislation. Although there are some basic 
standards, “best practice” is never static. 
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The second regulation function is monitoring and evaluation. This is to ensure that 
best practice standards are fit for purpose and correctly implemented by all relevant market 
participants. The monitoring of correct implementation is carried out by various experts: 
underwriters, reinsurers, brokers, loss adjusters, risk consultants and hostage negotiators. 
Monitoring is also carried out by criminals: kidnapping gangs test the effectiveness of the 
insureds’ risk mitigation strategies and identify inept negotiators generating large resolution 
costs.  Evaluation is easy: insurers who fall short of best practice lose market share and sustain 
(heavy) losses. The profit motive ensures a speedy correction or market exit.  
The third regulation function is intervention. A credible threat of sanctions ensures 
compliance by customers and competitors and incentivises experts to provide high quality 
services. Intervention happens mostly at the firm level: unlucky and inept experts are 
dismissed. Further intervention functions are carried out by the courts, where firms can be 
sued for breach of their “care of duty” towards their employees. Finally, Lloyd’s of London, 
where the vast majority of kidnap for ransom insurance is underwritten can close member 
syndicates which destabilise the market (Shortland 2016).  
- Insert Table 1 here – 
 
 
4.3. Co-production of governance 
 Although the key actors in devising the governance architecture are private insurers, 
the governance architecture is more accurately described as polycentric (Aligica and Tarko 
2013). Criminals carry out important functions in kidnap for ransom governance: in search of 
private profit they “monitor” the  effectiveness of prevention measures and the quality of 
negotiators. Kidnapping of unaware and undefended customers and high ransoms set in 
motion the evaluation and intervention process. The “quality of crime” in a particular area 
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influences the standard-setting process of the insurers – and mafias may be employed in 
providing security for customers where states permit mafias to control territory.  
Governments play an important intervention role. The state enforces contracts between 
insurers and their customers and the threat of being sued keeps both customers and non-
customers compliant with “best practice” standards. The shading in table 1 therefore 
indicates significant co-production of governance between states, insurers and criminals.   
 
5. The Practice of Governing Kidnap for Ransom 
5.1 Governance Domain (A): Insurance Contracts  
 As Fink and Pingle (2014) observe, kidnap insurance is only welfare-improving if it does 
not raise the risk of kidnapping significantly. This requires careful management of moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Heimer 1985).  A standard procedure has emerged in kidnap 
for ransom. Access to and the terms of insurance are controlled by expert underwriters. 
Globally, there are less than 20 insurers underwriting and reinsuring kidnap and ransom 
products, all of which maintain syndicates at Lloyd’s of London (Shortland 2016). Expert 
underwriters work in the Lloyd’s Lyme Street trading room, where they are approached by 
brokers to quote for specific kidnap risk exposures. Before entering a contract, insurers and 
brokers ask potential customers detailed questions about their travel plans and risk mitigation 
strategies (Lobo Guerrero 2007).19 This addresses adverse selection. Certain operations are 
                                                          
19See the application form for corporate special risks insurance at Aspen for the details required.   
http://www.aspen-apj.com/globalassets/corporate-contingency-proposal-form-g.pdf  
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deemed “not insurable”, requiring customers to revise their business or travel plans – or turn 
to their governments for protection (see Haufler 1997, 1999).  
If an insurer underwrites a specific activity, the contract directly addresses moral 
hazard. Firstly, the insured must not relax their vigilance. A company buying kidnap insurance 
on behalf of its employees is not allowed to disclose this to its staff members (Marsh 2011, 
Lobo-Guerrero 2007). Disclosing the insurance cover invalidates the contract. Most insurers 
demand / offer (discounted) training and thorough security (Terra Firma 2014). Employees 
are trained to avoid risk and receive advice on how to behave in the event of a kidnap. 
Insurance cover is only available up to a maximum ransom limit set at the level the firm or 
family could afford to pay in the absence of insurance. In the event of a kidnap the insured 
must raise the cash themselves and the insurance contract cannot be used as collateral to 
obtain a bank loan (Terra Firma 2014). The ransom is reimbursed (up to the pre-agreed 
threshold) by the insurer after the case has concluded. 
 Monitoring of contracts is done by brokers: they compare the quotes and contractual 
conditions of the various underwriters before making recommendations to their customers. 
Insurers therefore quickly find out about new products which divert customers away from 
them. Reinsurers also scrutinise contracts, leading to a convergence of standards by refusing 
reinsurance or demanding a high premium for underwriting high-risk, non-standard contracts 
(Cutler et al 1999). Loss adjusters monitor clients’ adherence to the terms of the contract if 
they file a claim: examples of “self-kidnapping” and collusion with criminals abound (Lopez 
2011, NYT 1981 and Telegraph 2008). The syndicates evaluate which innovations are both 
profitable and sustainable – copying from other market participants. Risky strategies usually 
fail in the medium term, leading to market exit.   
17 
 
Intervention on insurance contracts may be required vis-à-vis customers, experts and 
insurers. If customers are suspected of a breach of contract or fraud, reimbursement is 
withheld and the case is disputed in court. Underwriters, brokers, and loss adjusters can be 
dismissed and unsuccessful products can be discontinued. Intervention between insurers may 
be necessary if a syndicate’s lax contract conditions undermine the entire market rather than 
just the individual enterprise. The kidnap for ransom insurance market is highly vulnerable to 
myopic behaviour. Insurers can always undercut competitors, collect premium income, and 
default when losses mount up. Additionally, kidnap for ransom insurers who economise on 
expert fees confer externalities to the rest of the sector. Unaware targets and quick payments 
of large ransoms create kidnapping booms – which are problematic for all insurers (Shortland 
2016, UN 2013, Wright 2009). The vast majority of kidnap insurance is underwritten or 
reinsured by member syndicates of Lloyd’s of London (Shortland 2016). Syndicates have to 
renew their membership on an annual basis. The Lloyd’s corporation can close any syndicate 
which acts in contravention of the market’s interest (Lloyd’s Annual Report 2011 p8). This 
results in a remarkable degree of consistency in practices across firms (Smets et al 2012). 
 
5.2 Governance Domain (B): prevention and the “business risk” consultancies  
With escalating ransoms for high profile executives in Latin America in the early 1970s 
insurers realised that they must actively manage their exposure. Crucially, the number of 
incidents had to be reduced: i.e. “the emphasis [is put] on prevention rather than insurance" 
(Bankrate 2012). The business risk consultancy Control Risks was founded as part of the travel 
insurer Hogg Robinson in 1975 (The Telegraph 2007). With the backing of Lloyd’s insurance 
brokers, Control Risks developed new "kidnap and ransom" insurance policies, where its staff 
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(mostly ex-SAS officers20) provided security consulting as a condition of insurance against 
terrorist or criminal threats (Hagedorn Auerbach 1998). In 1980-81 the company was bought 
out by five members of its management team. Control Risks operates as an independent 
company, but is retained by Hiscox, the world’s largest underwriter of Kidnap and Ransom 
insurance.  
Crime prevention is at the core of its business: “Control Risks Group Holdings Ltd. 
provides risk consultancy services to organizations for managing political, integrity, and 
security risks in complex and hostile environments. It supports clients by providing strategic 
consultancy…, and providing practical on-the-ground protection and support.”21 The close link 
between insurers and “business risk consulting” is replicated across the industry (see 
Appendix).  
Business risk consultants advise on firms’ travel plans or permanent operations in 
territories where formal law and order are weak. The consultants recommend reliable hotels, 
transport services and transit routes. Where the risks are higher, they give advice on how to 
obtain effective protection. The local “protectors” may be off-duty police officers or private 
guards – sometimes linked to the mafias, insurgents and warlords studied in the criminal 
governance literature (e.g. Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014). However, the insured are 
not involved in illegal transactions. Protection payments are “above board”, e.g. the insured 
pay a legitimate company for guards or accommodation in a “safe” compound. In particularly 
complex security environments clients obtain private military security – often from the 
business risk consultancies themselves.  
                                                          
20 The Special Air Service (SAS) is the UK’s elite special forces unit. 
21 http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=128436  
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Indeed, the probability of being kidnapped when insured for kidnap for ransom is low. 
Clutterbuck (1987 p:100) estimated that of 2400 reported kidnap cases between 1976 and 
1986, only 3.5% were insured cases. Control Risks’ website advertises the company’s 
experience of resolving just over 2800 cases of “kidnap, piracy, extortion, threat and illegal 
detention”. This is not an excessive number of kidnaps in over 40 years in the business. 
Similarly, Terra Firma (2015) reports “almost 100” kidnaps of Chinese workers worldwide 
since 2001, but with an expatriate workforce of at least one million in 2014 this is a low figure. 
Lopez (2011 p:xiv) also points out that “90 per cent of kidnappings globally are locals, not 
expats or tourists”. Ochoa (2012) shows that Mexican kidnappers deliberately changed 
strategy to target poorer, low profile victims to evade the pressures the well-resourced and 
well-connected brought to bear against criminal gangs.  
The mandated standards for prevention vary between insurers and over time. 
Partially, they depend on the risk appetite of the insurer. The market leaders spend less time 
scrutinising individual travel plans: they can absorb occasional losses from their premium 
income. Smaller insurers are more risk averse, but reward careful risk mitigation with lower 
insurance premia. Prevention measures constantly evolve and adapt to changing security 
environments. The monitoring is done by criminals: unsuccessful prevention costs insurers 
dearly and undermines the credibility of the risk consultancy. In turn, the business risk 
consultants hold ineffective protectors to account. Private protection is a lucrative business: 
e.g. The Guardian (2012) reported that Shell spent $383million on protecting its staff and 
installations in the Niger Delta between 2009-2012.22 As the consultancies can redirect their 
                                                          
22 This does not imply that Shell is insured for kidnaps, large multinationals often self-insure.  
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customers to other areas or different protectors, it is in the protectors’ interest to deliver the 
promised services.  
Firms employing business risk consultants evaluate the effectiveness of prevention by 
looking at their bottom line: insufficient standards generate losses and overblown security 
measures reduce company profits. Intervention and enforcement therefore takes the form of 
employing successful business risk consultancies, who provide effective security at the lowest 
price. In turn, risk consultancies need to ensure that firms do not cut corners on prevention. 
Taking advice or buying protection is not necessarily mandatory. However, there is an implicit 
threat that firms will be sued in case of preventable abductions (Interviews III, XII, XIII). Retired 
and freelance risk consultants stand ready to serve as expert witnesses on whether a firm has 
followed “best management practice” in the case.23 If firms correctly follow security advice, 
their insurance includes cover for “legal liabilities” should employees take legal action (Marsh 
2011).  
 
5.3. Governance Domain (C): Resolution and the “crisis response” consultancies  
The resolution of kidnap for ransom is the domain of “crisis response” consultancies. 
These are usually specialist units within the business risk consultancies, though some are “in 
house” teams (e.g. at Tokio Marine). Crisis responders employ expert negotiators to order 
transactions with criminals and contain ransoms by taking control of ransom negotiations. 
Again, Control Risks was the first mover in the field in 1975 (Campbell 2002, Clutterbuck 1978, 
                                                          
23  Business risk consultants also provide expert witness services when uninsured firms are sued over 
a breach of “duty of care”. This creates additional demand for their services – and ultimately 
insurance. 
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1987, Hagedorn Auerbach 1998). “In the event of a kidnap, Control Risks will deploy a 
consultant [who] will evaluate the circumstances, advise on possible options and explain the 
likely sequence of events. He or she will advise on negotiation strategies, [and] undertake 
appropriate liaison with all interested parties.”24 Other insurers noted the success of this 
innovation: Ackermann was founded in 1977 and Neil Young Associates in 1990. The massive 
expansion of the “political risks” insurance market in the 2000s saw the foundation of several 
further crisis responders (see Appendix). Expert ransom negotiators ensure hostage safety 
and encourage stakeholders how to minimise the ransom.  
 
5.3.1 Ordering the trade in hostages 
Insurers need to incentivise kidnappers to treat their hostages well and release them 
on payment of the ransom. Insurance turns transnational kidnapping into a repeated game: 
kidnappers can be rewarded for smooth resolutions and punished for violence and cheating 
in subsequent encounters. A Mexican kidnapper revealed this perception in the criminal 
community: “… his treatment [of the hostage] would act as a calling card for future hostages… 
no-one’s going to negotiate with someone who has a track record of blowing his victims’ 
brains out.” (Lopez 2011 p:70). The crisis responders keep extensive case files and consultants 
develop specialist knowledge in particular kidnap areas (Interviews III, IV, V, VI, XII, XIII). 
Relevant information is shared in the community of hostage negotiators. These are largely 
drawn from the elite military forces and many of them are members of the Special Forces 
                                                          
24 https://www.controlrisks.com/en/services/security-risk/crisis-management/kidnap-preparedness-
and-response accessed March 2016 
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Club in London (Campbell 2002, Interviews IV, V, VI).25 As members of a close-knit community 
they can informally co-operate, communicate and exchange sensitive information. 
Furthermore, the underwriters of kidnap insurance communicate the outcomes of their cases 
in the Underwriting Room at Lloyd’s.   
Information-sharing incentivises smooth resolutions - particularly if there is a credible 
threat of employing state security forces against violent or cheating kidnappers. Most 
kidnappers operate in states with some capacity to enforce law and order (e.g. Mexico, 
Nigeria, Colombia, Pakistan) or in “failed states” where elite troops could directly intervene 
on behalf of their citizens (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia). Ochoa (2012) shows that gang survival 
and profitability depends on staying “under the radar”. Mexican police cracked down on 
violent gangs and those targeting specific communities which organised themselves to 
pressure the government to take action. Victims’ representatives generally have a choice 
between using “commercial resolution” and involving the security forces.26 As many hostages 
have perished alongside their captors in rescue operations, this tactic is only attractive if the 
hostage’s life is under threat (Clutterbuck 1987, Lopez 2011).  If criminals build reputations 
for returning unharmed hostages and reliably releasing their victims on payment of the 
agreed ransom – i.e. orderly commercial resolution - the security forces are kept at arms’ 
length.27 Maritime lawyer Stephen Askins illustrates this “carrot and stick” approach 
regarding Somali piracy (House of Commons 2012, p57): “In a commercial sense, we would 
                                                          
25 See the Ackerman and Red 24 teams for examples https://www.ackermangroup.com/#team and 
https://www.red24.com/nonmembers/specialists.php  
26 Lopez (2011) even mentions a case in which a privates security company offered a “rescue” option 
27 Once the hostage is safely returned, risk consultancies co-operate with the police to reduce the 
risk of future kidnaps. 
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rather there was minimum government involvement in the negotiation process. They can help 
where help is called for, but generally we get it, we understand it, we have a process and, on 
a commercial level, it works.” 
  If formal law-enforcement is not a credible threat, torturing and killing some hostages 
may raise ransoms for future victims - as Leeson (2010) showed for pirates employing 
“torture- for-reputation”. In inaccessible areas (e.g. Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq) rescues are 
likely to fail for lack of information. If the police are potentially complicit in kidnapping, 
criminals can also become more violent (e.g. Russia, Mexico and Pakistan). Even so, crisis 
responders only proceed with ransom negotiations with proof of life and proof of possession 
by the kidnappers – preferably a direct telephone conversation with the victim or answers to 
questions only the victim would know (Lopez 2011, Terra Firma 2014). Consultants also use 
informal channels of communication through local elites (or a “government in exile”) to put 
pressure on the kidnappers (Interview IV). Crisis responders therefore order transactions at 
the legal / criminal interface. Their other role is to prevent moral hazard among the insured 
regarding ransom payments. 
 
5.3.2 Ransom Discipline 
Stakeholders faced with threats to their loved one might try to settle quickly for the 
maximum insured amount or however much ransom they can raise. But high ransoms might 
change kidnappers’ expectations of how much hostages are “worth” and influence concurrent 
and subsequent negotiations (Terra Firma 2014 p:2). This can then set in motion a vicious 
cycle in which more criminals enter the kidnapping business, demand higher ransoms, which 
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– if paid – generate further kidnaps (Shortland 2016, UN 2013, Wright 2009). Kidnapping is 
only stable as long as there are no super-normal returns.  
When a kidnap occurs, the insurer’s “crisis responder” immediately dispatches one or 
two consultants with significant prior negotiation experience and any relevant information 
about previous and concurrent kidnaps in the region to advise the family or company on how 
to negotiate the ransom (Clutterbuck 1987, Lobo-Guerrero 2007, Lopez 2011). Professional 
negotiators reassure the family and steer the negotiation towards a target settlement 
appropriate to the case and region – rather than their own financial position. "In every country 
in the world where there is a kidnapping issue, there is more or less an established market for 
how much you're going to end up paying. In Mexico, it's $300,000 to $1 million. In Honduras, 
it's $100,000 to $300,000 and so forth." (Bankrate 2012). Negotiations led by professionals 
usually settle for a small percentage of the originally demanded ransom (Clutterbuck 1987, 
Lopez 2011, March 1988, Interviews IV, V).  
Insurers cannot force victim stakeholders to act in the interests of the insurance 
industry.  All decisions are made by the stakeholders in the best interest of “their” victim –
risk consultants only offer advice. However, the literature in social psychology, neuroscience 
and experimental economics shows that “high credibility” sources affect decisions, especially 
for risky choices (Klucharev et al 2008). Indeed, the consultants are highly skilled in conducting 
negotiations and most have a long track record. As former elite military personnel they are 
naturally competitive and thrive in adversarial situations. They remain calm in stressful 
situations and understand the criminal mind-set and psychology (Interview IV, Lopez 2011, 
March 1988). Their military experience is useful for planning ransom drops and the 
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evacuation of released hostages (Interviews IV and V). Worried stakeholders therefore usually 
welcome professional support (Interviews X, XI and XV, March 1988).  
Lopez (2011) and March (1988) explain how professional negotiators control the 
negotiations. A communicator is nominated to relay information between the kidnapper and 
the decision-makers. A Crisis Management Team deliberates on each development or revised 
demand. At each stage the consultant offers the decision-maker a set of options: “I make 
options, they make the call. That’s how it works” (Lopez 2011 p:103). Stakeholders wishing to 
settle early are warned against a “double cross”, where kidnappers raise their demand if the 
stakeholders accede, rather than releasing the hostage (Interviews III, IV, V, March 1988, 
Terra Firma 2014 p:4). Even if kidnappers return the hostage, firms and families which quickly 
pay large ransoms are attractive future targets (Lopez 2011, p:113, Wright 2009). Most 
stakeholders therefore go through the “theatre” of mimicking the behaviour of a cash 
constrained family or firm, slowly raising their offers in decreasing increments to converge at 
an appropriate settlement for the case (Catlins 2012, Lopez 2011, March 1988, Interviews I, 
III, IV, V, XI). By limiting ransoms and increasing the negotiation time insurers reduce the 
attractiveness of kidnapping as a business model.  
 
5.3.3. Setting and maintaining standards  
The original standard for the resolution of hostage crises was set by Control Risks, but 
the techniques were swiftly copied by Ackermann and Neil Young. With the explosion of 
demand for kidnap for ransom insurance after 2000, former employees of these agencies set 
up their own businesses. The established protocols (separation of communicator from 
decision-maker, disruptive bargaining, diminishing increments) are generally observed 
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(Interviews III, IV, V, VI). The evaluation of crisis response consultants is carried out by 
criminals, who are quick to spot a weak negotiator - or one who has lost control over the 
stakeholders and media coverage of a case. Expert quality can thus be easily ascertained from 
their track record: ransoms, negotiation durations and customer satisfaction.  
Enforcement of standards occurs through an active market for good negotiators. Only 
the largest crisis responders have permanent staff. Most negotiators are employed on a case-
by-case basis (Interviews IV, V, VI). Response consultants know each other’s reputations: a 
track-record of clean and cheap resolutions guarantees an attractive income stream.  A 
bungled negotiation is problematic and in extreme cases inept consultants are taken off their 
case (Lopez 2011). The experts’ common military background creates a supportive network 
in which information is exchanged and advice is available, aiding the convergence of practices 
(Interviews III, IV, V, VI). Ultimately, however, only effective crisis responders are retained by 
the insurers to handle their cases. It is therefore in the interest of the crisis responders to 
evaluate their staff and headhunt effective negotiators.   
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6. Discussion  
Table 2 summarises the governance architecture for kidnap for ransom, created by the 
underwriters of kidnap for ransom insurance to limit, order and stabilise the trade in 
hostages. There are a number of interesting features.  
- Insert Table 2 here -  
The first is the key role of experts in setting and adapting standards in an evolving 
threat situation. There are three types of experts: underwriters set standards for transactions 
with customers, business risk consultants deal with prevention and crisis response 
consultants order the trade in hostages.28 Within each area, the experts share norms, a policy 
enterprise, beliefs and criteria for evaluating new evidence. Each set of experts thus forms an 
“epistemic community”. Underwriting at Lloyd’s is a long-term, “boy-to-man” profession 
(Interview XVI). Communication is facilitated by the physical proximity of experts in the 
underwriting room and a shared concern for system stability (Interviews V, XVI). In domains 
(B) and (C) the epistemic community is underpinned by recruitment from elite military and 
law enforcement units.  
The second key feature is that syndicates evaluate whether standards are maintained 
(or have been successfully adapted) by looking at the profits and losses for their risk 
exposures. This underlines the insight from the private governance literature that providing 
governance is a business. In kidnap for ransom some business models work – and some are 
more profitable (and sustainable) than others. Effective governance reduces losses, so 
insurance premia can be lowered. Successful innovators quickly gain market share and 
                                                          
28 In the smaller consultancies some experts are both risk consultants and crisis responders. 
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competitors either have to adapt or cease underwriting.  When new risks emerge there is a 
flurry of product development – e.g. “hijack for ransom” insurance in response to Somali 
piracy. As ransoms escalated, many boutique insurers suffered heavy losses and withdrew 
from the market (House of Commons 2012). There are also mergers and take-overs if a 
syndicate has an attractive “book” but wishes to exit from underwriting specific risks. As the 
system relies on expert governance and there is a competitive market for expertise, the 
fluidity of the syndicates’ underwriting activity is of little practical consequence. What matters 
is that the underwriting, risk evaluation, security advice and crisis resolution are delivered by 
the best experts in their respective fields.  
 The third key feature of the governance architecture is the use of contracts to enforce 
standards and reward successful innovation. Contracts specify the insured’s obligation to 
prevent and limit the extent of the criminal damage. This is monitored by loss adjusters and 
enforced by courts. Many consultancies are on short-term or even case-specific contracts 
with the insurers, creating intense pressure to provide value for money. In turn, the smaller 
consultancies employ experts for specific cases based on their performance record 
(Interviews V and VI). Criminal gangs constantly test the efficacy of prevention measures and 
the quality of negotiators. Only outstanding experts are in full-time, salaried employment.  
The fourth key feature is the role of Lloyd’s in stabilising the market (Shortland 2016). 
Although underwriters and consultants experiment with new products, processes and 
techniques at the margin, certain business practices are central for system stability and form 
part of the standard Lloyd’s protocol. The necessary information to price kidnap insurance 
correctly is only shared among underwriters with syndicates at Lloyd’s. Therefore 
membership of Lloyd’s is crucial for profitability. The Lloyd’s Corporation’s explicit threat to 
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exclude any syndicate which imposes costs on the rest of the sector underpins the entire 
governance architecture (Lloyd’s Annual Report 2011 p8). 
The final key feature is the polycentric nature of the governance system (Aligica and 
Tarko 2013). The beneficiaries of a well-governed trade in hostages are insurers, the insured, 
criminals and ultimately states, who use the private governance system to safeguard the 
security of their citizens abroad. Governance is co-produced by these various actors.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The paper argues that insurers take the lead role in governing criminal kidnap for 
ransom. Kidnap insurers require their customers to engage in active security management 
and offer business solutions to prevent kidnapping. Although the insured are financially 
attractive kidnapping targets, transnational kidnaps are relatively rare. When kidnaps occur, 
insurers have devised a resolution system which returns the vast majority of hostages safely 
without stimulating the expansion of kidnapping. Experts play a key role in setting and 
applying standards. The effectiveness of these standards (and customer compliance with 
them) is tested by the criminal underworld. Criminal successes translate into financial losses 
and economic agents draw the appropriate consequences. Fraud, negligence and 
recklessness are dealt with through the formal institutions of courts and the Lloyd’s 
corporation. The governance system adapts to changes in economic opportunities, criminal 
tactics and the legal framework. When governance works, providing kidnap for ransom 
insurance is lucrative. Otherwise, the personal and financial consequences can be 
catastrophic. 
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Governing criminal markets involves facilitating transactions which are not widely 
accepted as “ethical” business behaviour, such as employing private protection and paying 
ransoms to criminal and insurgent groups. However, most people agree that it is in the 
national interest that a country’s firms operate in emerging markets, that NGOs deliver aid, 
journalists report from conflict zones and that oil and minerals are extracted. If companies 
and NGOs have a duty of care towards their employees then orderly resolution of kidnaps is 
invaluable. Governance of international transactions at the criminal / legal interface cannot 
be delivered by home governments. Therefore insurers have created the necessary 
institutions to order such transactions. Buchanan (1973) argued that governance of criminal 
markets reduces overall crime. Indeed, the insurers’ profit motive results in the reduction of 
social “bads”: kidnappings and the number of hostages killed are low and transfers to 
kidnappers are reduced.  Kidnap insurance allows companies to pursue profit opportunities 
in weak states and yet fulfil their duty of care to their employees. By providing formal 
governance facilities to insurers the state tacitly supports the private governance regime.  
This pragmatic recognition of the benefits of orderly transactions in criminal kidnaps 
begs the question why governments explicitly exclude insurers from ordering “terrorist” 
kidnap for ransom. An outright no-negotiation stance is politically problematic and ultimately 
not credible (Block and Tinsley 2008, UN 2013, White House Briefing 2015). Some 
governments regularly pay multi-million dollar ransoms to terrorist organisations (NYT 2014): 
they have soft budget constraints and short time horizons as they usually conduct 
negotiations in the media spot-light. There is no mechanism to internalise the spill-overs of 
premium ransom payments on hostages from other nations. The US recently changed policy 
to permit families to ransom loved ones (White House Briefing 2015). Most families have 
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lower budgets than governments, but crowd-funding and philanthropic donations can 
undermine ransom discipline even here. Recent ransom inflation and the murder of hostages 
from non-negotiating nations suggest that the governance vacuum for “terrorist” kidnaps is 
increasingly filled by terrorist organisations. Al Qaeda, IS and Boko Haram are establishing 
reputations for orderly commercial resolutions at premium prices - and death otherwise. They 
are reaping the financial rewards of providing governance, as criminal and opportunistic 
kidnappers pass hostages to them (Safer Yemen 2014 pii, Interviews V, XIII). It is in the public 
interest that these unintended consequences of the present policy are recognised. Future 
policy should be informed by a careful analysis of the private regime ordering criminal kidnap 
for ransom. 
32 
 
REFERENCES  
Agnafors, Magnus. 2013. Quality of Government: Toward a More Complex Definition 
American Political Science Review 107(3): 433-445  
Aligica, Paul and Vlad Tarko. 2013.  “Co-Production, Polycentricity and Value Heterogeneity: 
The Ostroms’ Public Choice Institutionalism Revisited”; American Political Science 
Review 107(4): 726-741  
Ambrus, Attila, Chaney, Eric and Igor Salitskiy. 2015. Pirates of the Mediterranean: An 
Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction Costs, ERID Working Paper 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/chaney/files/pirates.pdf?m=1431107199  
Bates, Robert ; Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. 2002. Organizing Violence; Journal of Conflict 
Resolution October 2002 46: 599-628,  
Block, Walter and Patrick Tinsley. 2008. Should the Law Prohibit Paying Ransom to  
Kidnappers?"  America Review of Political Economy, 6:2 pp 40-45  
Browne Julie and Eric S. Dickson. 2010. ‘‘We Don’t Talk to Terrorists’’: On the Rhetoric and 
Practice of Secret Negotiations Journal of Conflict Resolution  54 pp379-407, 
Camacho, Adriana and Catherine Rodriguez. 2013. Firm Exit and Armed Conflict in Colombia 
Journal of Conflict Resolution  57: 89-116 
Campana, Paolo. 2013. Understanding then responding to Italian organised crime operations 
across territories. Policing, 7(3): 316-325. 
Clendenin, Meadow. 2006-2007. ‘No Concessions’ with no teeth: how kidnap and ransom 
insurers and insureds are undermining U.S. counterterrorism policy. Emory Law 
Journal 56(3) 741-775 
33 
 
Clutterbuck, Richard. 1978. Kidnap and Ransom; St Martin’s Press New York 
Clutterbuck, Richard. 1987. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion: the Response; St Martin’s Press New 
York 
Cutler, Claire, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds). 1999.  Private Authority in International 
Affairs, State University of New York Press  
Fink, Alexander and Mark Pingle. 2014. Kidnap insurance and its impact on kidnapping 
outcomes, Public Choice Volume 160, Issue 3 pp481-499 
Gambetta, Diego. 1993. The Sicilian Mafia. Harvard University Press  
Greif, Avner. 2005. Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of 
Institutions Supporting Exchange in C. Menard and M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of 
New Institutional Economics, pp 727–786, Springer. 
Hagedorn Auerbach, Ann. 1998 Ransom: The untold story of international kidnapping. New 
York: Henry Holt and Company 
Haufler, Virginia. 1997. Dangerous Commerce:  State and Market in the International Risks 
Insurance Regime Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997 
Haufler, Virginia. 1999. Self-Regulation and Business Norms: Political Risk and Political 
Activism in Cutler, Claire, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds)  Private Authority in 
International Affairs, State University of New York Press 
Heimer, Carol Anne. 1985. Reactive Risk and Rational Action: Managing Moral Hazard in 
Insurance Contracts; University of California Press  
Jakobi, Anja. 2015. Non-state Actors and Global Crime Governance: explaining the variance 
of public-private interaction British Journal of Politics and International Relations  
34 
 
Kenney Samantha. 2007/08. Regional Shortcomings And Global Solutions: Kidnap, Ransom 
and Insurance In Latin America; Connecticut Insurance Law Journal; 14(2): 557- 588  
Klucharev, Vasily; Ale Smidts, and Guillén Fernández. 2008. Brain mechanisms of persuasion: 
how ‘expert power’ modulates memory and attitudes; Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience 3(4): 353-366  
Lee Chia-yi. 2013. Democracy, civil liberties, and hostage-taking terrorism Journal of Peace 
Research  50: 235-248 
Leeson Peter. 2006. An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization; Journal of 
Political Economy, 115(6): 1049-1094 
Leeson Peter. 2010. Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices; Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization 76:3 497–510 
Leeson, Peter and Alex Nowrasteh. 2011. Was Privateering Plunder Efficient?” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 79(3): 303-317  
Leeson, Peter and Douglas Rogers. 2009. Organizing Crime; Supreme Court Economic Review 
20(1): 89-123 
Lewis, Paul. 2001. Guerrillas and Generals: The Dirty War in Argentina Praeger Publishers 
Lobo-Guerrero, L. 2007. Biopolitics of specialised risk: An Analysis of Kidnap and Ransom 
Insurance. Security dialogue, 38(3): 315-334. 
Lopez. Ben. 2011. The Negotiator: my life at the heart of the hostage trade; Little Brown 
Book Group London 
March. James. 1988. The Negotiator. Weidenfeld and Nicholson; London 
35 
 
Merkling Sheri and Elaine Davis. 2001. Kidnap & Ransom Insurance: A Rapidly Growing Benefit 
Compensation & Benefits Review  33: 40-45,  
Munger, Michael. 2010. Endless Forms Most Beautiful and Most Wonderful. 
Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions; Public Choice, 143(3): 263-268 
Ochoa, R. 2012. Not just the rich: new tendencies in kidnappings in Mexico City, Global Crime 
13(1): 1-21 
ODI 2010: Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments, 
Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute 
Pshisva Rony & Gustavo A. Suarez, 2010. "Capital Crimes: Kidnappings and Corporate 
Investment in Colombia," in The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin 
America, pages 63-97 National Bureau of Economic Research  
Rodriguez, Catherine and Edgar Villa. 2012. Kidnap risks and migration: evidence from 
Colombia. Journal of Population Economics 25(3): 1139-1164. 
Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel and Philip Verwimp. 2014. Extortion with Protection:  
Understanding the Effect of Rebel Taxation on Civilian Welfare in Burundi; Journal of 
Conflict Resolution  58: 1474-1499  
Salter, Brian. 1999. Change in the Governance of Medicine: the politics of self-regulation. 
Policy and Politics Vol 27(2): 143-158 
Salter, Brian. 2001. Who Rules? The new politics of medical regulation; Social Science and 
Medicine. Vol 52(6): 871 - 883 
Sandler, Todd, Patrick T. Brandt and Justin George. 2016. Why Concessions Should Not Be 
Made to Terrorist Kidnappers; European Journal of Political Economy Vol 44(1): 41–52 
36 
 
Shortland A. 2015. Can We Stop Talking about Somali Piracy Now? Peace Economics, Peace 
Science and Public Policy 21(4): DOI: 10.1515/peps-2015-0018,  
Shortland A. 2016. Governing Kidnap for ransom: Lloyd’s as a private regime. Forthcoming in 
Governance 
Shortland A and Varese F. 2015. 'State-building, Informal Governance and Organized Crime: 
the case of Somali Piracy; Political Studies doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12227 
Skaperdas, Stergios. 2001. The political economy of organized crime: Providing protection 
when the state does not. Economics of Governance 2(3): 173-202 
Skarbek. David. 2011. Governance and Prison Gangs. American Political Science 
Review 105(4): 702-716. 
Skarbek. David. 2014. The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the 
American Penal System, Oxford University Press 
Smets, Michael;  Jarzabkowski, Paula; Burke, Gary and Paul Spee. 2015. Reinsurance Trading 
in Lloyd’s of London: Balancing Conflicting-yet-Complementary Logics in Practice; 
Academic Management Journal 58(3): 932-970 
Stringham, Edward. 2015. Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life. 
Oxford University Press 
United Nations 2013: Human rights and issues related to terrorist hostage-taking. Report of 
the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee A/HRC/24/47   
Varese, Federico. 2001. The Russian Mafia. Private Protection in a New Market Economy. 
Oxford University Press. 
37 
 
Varese, Federico. 2010. What is organized crime? In Organized crime: Critical concepts in 
criminology, edited by Federico Varese, London: Routledge, vol. 1, pp. 1–33 
Varese, Federico. 2011. Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New 
Territories; Princeton University Press 
Varese, Federico. 2014. ‘Protection and Extortion’, in Handbook of Organized Crime, edited 
by Letizia Paoli, Oxford University Press, pp. 343-358. 
Wright, Richard Peter. 2009. Kidnap for ransom: Resolving the Unthinkable. Auerbach 
Publications 
 
 
Internet Sources and Newspaper articles 
Agenda Week May 29 2012: “How Do You Manage Kidnapping Risk? Delicately” available at 
https://www.red24.com/uploads/JC_Agenda_FT_May_2012-1.pdf  
Bankrate 22 October 2012 “Firms snatch up kidnap and ransom insurance” 
Bloomberg 27 Feb 2015: “Four Thai hostages held for five years released by Somali pirates” 
Business Insurance 01 May 2008 “Kidnap and ransom insurance covers a wide range of 
risks” 
Campbell Duncan. 2002. “Cozy Clubby and Covert”   
Catlins 2012: “Kidnap and Ransom Today”  
Financial Times 6 Apr 2006: “Shell’s problems in Nigeria mount up” 
Financial Times 1 June 2011: “Dealing with kidnappers – all in a day’s work” 
38 
 
Foreign Policy 8 January 2015. “Insurance Companies in the Cross-Hairs of Terror Funding 
Crackdown.” 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 11 December 2012: “Piracy Ransoms Task Force 
publishes recommendations”  
Hiscox 2014: Crisis management corporate guidelines  
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2012):  “Piracy off the coast of Somalia Tenth 
Report of Session 2010–12 “   
Insurance business online 11 October 2012: “Brokers get kidnap and ransom offering” 
Marsh Marine Practice 2011: “Piracy – the insurance implications”  
Murphy on Piracy 2 September 2012: “Two scars on the conscience of the shipping industry”  
New York Times 6 November 1981 “THE CITY; Conviction Upheld In Sindona Case” 
New York Times 19 August 1998: “Mexico Says It Has Kidnapper Who Cut Wealthy Victims' 
Ears” 
New York Times 29 July 2014 (a): “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror” 
Reuters 6 July 2011: “Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants” 
Safer Yemen 2014 Changing tactics and Motives: Kidnapping of foreigners in Yemen 2010-
2014;  
Terra Firma 2014: “Barking up the wrong tree - ransom payments and sanctioned 
organisations” 
Terra Firma 2015: “The threat to Chinese companies working overseas” 
The Economist 16 September 2004: “Lloyd’s of London: Insuring for the future?” 
39 
 
The Economist Aug 24th 2006: “A King’s Ransom: Insuring against kidnap and extortion is a 
growth industry”  
The Economist Jun 27th 2013 : “Kidnap and ransom insurance: I’m a client… Get me out of 
here”  
The Guardian 01 November 2009: “Somali pirate ransoms 'could fund terrorists'” 
The Guardian 19 August 2012: “Shell spending millions of dollars on security in Nigeria, 
leaked data shows” 
The Guardian 25 August 2014: “The murky world of hostage negotiations; is the price ever 
right?”  
The Independent, October 17, 2010: “The £1bn Hostage trade” 
The Telegraph 11 December 2007: “Control Risks in talks with rival” 
The Telegraph 11 December 2008: “Wife conned husband out of £530,000 with fake 
kidnaps” 
The Times 7 January 2012: “The piracy  racket begins here, in the city” 
White House 24 June 2015: “Statement by the President on the U.S. Government's Hostage 
Policy Review” 
 
  
40 
 
Interviews 
Interview I: Professional Ransom Negotiator (March 2012) 
Interview II: Professional Ransom Negotiator (March 2012)  
Interview III: Professional Ransom Negotiator (December 2014) 
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Interview XVI: Insurance specialist  (June 2015) 
 
  
41 
 
Table 1: Governance domains and governance functions in kidnap for ransom 
Table 1  Regulation  Functions 
  Standard-
setting 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
Intervention 
G
o
ve
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an
ce
 
d
o
m
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s 
Insurance 
contracts (A) 
    
Prevention (B)   
 
    
Resolution (C)    
 
   
 
Producers of governance: split cells indicate co-production  
 Legal Private   Criminal   Government 
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Table 2: Governance architecture in kidnap for ransom 
 
 Table 2 Governance Functions 
  Standard-
setting 
Monitoring  Evaluation Intervention 
G
o
ve
rn
an
ce
 d
o
m
ai
n
s 
Insurance 
contracts (A) 
Expert 
underwriters  
Brokers, 
Reinsurers, 
Loss 
adjusters 
Syndicate 
profit / 
loss 
Courts for 
“compliance” 
Employers of 
experts 
Lloyd’s 
corporation 
Prevention (B) Expert 
business risk 
consultants 
/ Mafias 
Criminal 
gangs  
# of 
Kidnaps 
and value 
of targets 
Courts for 
“Duty of 
Care”  
Syndicate 
profit / 
loss 
Employers of 
experts 
Resolution (C) Expert crisis 
response  
consultants 
/ Mafias  
Criminal 
gangs 
Ransom / 
duration / 
violence 
Courts for 
“Duty of 
Care” 
Syndicate 
profit / 
loss 
Employers of 
experts 
Lloyd’s 
corporation 
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Appendix: K&R insurers and associated consultancies (March 2016) 
Insurers  Business Risk Consultants Crisis Responder(s) 
ACE Red 24 Red 24 
AIG Neil Young Associates Neil Young Associates, MS Risk 
ANV  MS Risk MS Risk, “expert consultants” 
Aspen AKE, Henderson Risk Aegis Response, Henderson 
Risk 
Beazley Furlonge Red 24, Hazelwood Street 
Consultants 
MAST, Hazelwood Street 
Consultants, Red 24 
Canopius “Supported by expert crisis 
consultants” 
“Supported by expert crisis 
consultants” 
Chubb Ackermann Ackermann 
CV Starr Neil Young Associates Neil Young Associates 
DUAL (Hyperion) MS Risk “expert consultants”, MS Risk 
Griffin Security Exchange 24 Security Exchange 24 
Hiscox Control Risks Control Risks 
Houston Casualty Unity Resources Unity Resources 
Ironshore Hazelwood Street Consultants Hazelwood Street Consultants 
Liberty Unity Resources Unity Resources 
Tokio Marine Kiln Not currently marketing K&R 
insurance 
“In house” response team 
Travelers  Olive  Olive  
QBE Red 24 Red 24 
XL Catlin  Terra Firma, Red 24, Compass Risk 
Management  
Terra Firma, Red 24, Compass 
Risk Management  
 
